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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we examine whether recent regulatory reforms requiring majority board 
independence are effective in reducing earnings management. Firms that did not have a majority 
of independent directors prior to the reforms (referred to as non-compliance firms) are required to 
increase their board independence. We find that overall, compared to the other firms, non-
compliance firms do not experience a significant decrease in the extent of earnings management 
from prior to the reforms to afterwards. However, we find that non-compliance firms with low 
information acquisition cost experience a significant reduction in earnings management compared 
with the other firms. The results hold for various proxies for information acquisition cost and 
earnings management. These findings indicate that independent directors’ monitoring is more 
effective in a richer information environment.  
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1. Introduction 
In response to the widespread corporate and accounting scandals in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, U.S. stock exchanges proposed and regulators approved a series of regulatory reforms to 
improve corporate governance, including increasing the independence of boards of directors. In 
2002, both the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of Securities 
Dealers (NASD) proposed new corporate governance rules for the listed companies, which were 
later approved by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2003. These rules required the 
listed companies to have a majority of independent directors on their boards of directors. One of 
the primary objectives of these reforms is to enhance the monitoring by the board, particularly the 
monitoring of the financial reporting process.  
However, such one-size-fits-all regulatory requirements face much criticism. These critiques 
mainly come from two fronts. The first line of criticism is based on the notion that the optimal 
corporate governance structure, including the independence level of the board, varies with 
industry and firm characteristics. For example, for firms where firm-specific knowledge of inside 
directors is important, imposing a requirement of majority director independence might decrease 
firm value (e.g., Adams et al. 2010). The second line of criticism questions the effectiveness of 
outside directors, especially those chosen after this new reform. While a higher level of board 
independence might be desirable, outside directors might not be effective monitors if they are 
handpicked by the CEOs or if firms merely use a “box-checking” approach to comply with the 
new regulations (e.g., Hwang and Kim 2009). It has also been recognized in the literature that 
outside directors’ effectiveness is hindered by their lack of information and that their 
effectiveness is higher when the cost for them to become informed, or the cost of information 
acquisition, is lower (e.g., Jensen 1993; Harrast and Mason-Olsen 2007; Adam and Ferreira 2007; 
Duchin et al. 2010).  
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In this paper, we investigate the effectiveness of these recent regulatory reforms by 
empirically examining whether an increase in board independence in response to the reforms is 
associated with a decrease in the extent of earnings management. In light of the potential 
ineffectiveness of outside directors’ monitoring due to a lack of information, we further 
investigate whether the impact of the increase in board independence on earnings management 
varies with the cost of information acquisition. If independent directors’ monitoring is more 
effective when the cost of information acquisition is lower, we expect to find a stronger 
association between the increase in board independence and the reduction in earnings 
management for firms with lower information acquisition cost than for firms with higher 
information acquisition cost.  
In our empirical tests, we use the year 2000 as the pre-regulation benchmark year and 2005 
as the post-regulation year. Both anecdotal evidence and our own analysis suggest that increases 
in board independence primarily occur from 2001 to 2004 and board independence levels are 
relatively stable prior to 2000 and after 2005. The extent of earnings management is measured by 
the average of the absolute value of discretionary accruals (|DA|) over the three-year period 
centered on the pre- and post-regulation years, i.e., 1999-2001 and 2004-2006, respectively. Our 
inferences remain the same if we compare |DA| between 2000 and 2005, or if we use Dechow and 
Dichev’s (2002) earnings quality measure.  
We test our hypotheses using 1,205 firms from the S&P 1500 index. We split the sample 
firms into two groups: those with majority board independence in 2000 and those without. The 
first group of firms, 68 percent of the sample, satisfied the regulatory requirement before the 
reforms and is referred to as compliance firms; the second group, 32 percent of the sample, is 
referred to as non-compliance firms. To comply with the regulatory requirements, non-
compliance firms have to increase board independence over time. We use the non-compliance 
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firm indicator as the instrument for the increase in board independence as a response to the 
regulatory reform and use compliance firms as the control group to control for the time-trend of 
earnings management during our sample period. 
We first confirm the overall decrease in earnings management documented in prior studies 
(e.g., Cohen et al. 2008). However, we find that compared to compliance firms, non-compliance 
firms overall do not experience a larger reduction in the extent of earnings management from the 
pre- to post-regulation periods. We then condition our analysis on the information acquisition 
cost. In the main tests we use analyst coverage as the inverse proxy for information acquisition 
cost faced by outsiders in obtaining firm-specific information, given prior evidence that higher 
analyst coverage is associated with more information about the firm.1 In sensitivity tests we use 
other proxies for information acquisition cost, such as an aggregate measure of information 
transparency (Andersen et al. 2009), industry expertise of independent director, firm size, and 
residual analyst coverage. We find that the reduction in earnings management in non-compliance 
firms decreases with information acquisition cost; only non-compliance firms with low 
information acquisition cost experience a significant decrease in earnings management compared 
to compliance firms. These results indicate that increasing board independence in itself is not 
effective in reducing earnings management and that outside directors are more effective monitors 
when they have access to more information.  
We conduct a series of additional analyses to enrich our results and provide additional 
insights. First, we investigate whether the change in earnings management varies with the means 
noncompliance companies use to increase board independence. Noncompliance firms can 
increase board independence by adding new independent directors, dropping old affiliated 
                                                 
1 It is well-established in the accounting and finance literature that analyst coverage is positively associated with the 
richness of firms’ information environment. See Schipper (1991), Healy and Palepu (2001), and Ramnath et al. 
(2008) for reviews of the related literature.  
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directors (including insiders), or doing both. We find that the results are driven by non-
compliance firms that have added new independent directors. That is, compared to compliance 
firms, only those non-compliance firms that have low information acquisition costs and have 
added new independent directors experience a decrease in earnings management. This suggests 
that simply removing existing affiliated directors is less likely to improve board monitoring 
compared to bringing in new independent directors.   
Second, using a similar research design, we investigate the impact on earnings management 
of the regulatory requirement on audit committee independence. In December 1999, the NYSE 
and NASD required the listed companies to have a 100 percent independent audit committee. This 
requirement is later reinforced by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. When we first define 
the non-compliance firms as those with a less than 100 percent independent audit committee in 
2000, we do not find any significant result on the main effect of the non-compliance indicator or 
its interaction with the information acquisition cost proxies. We then define the non-compliance 
firms as those with a less than 67 percent independent audit committee in 2000, in the belief that 
firms with a relatively lower level of audit committee independence should benefit more from a 
switch to 100 percent audit committee independence. We find that non-compliance firms with 
low information acquisition cost have a significantly larger decrease in earnings management than 
compliance firms. These findings suggest that an increase in audit committee independence 
coupled with information access leads to a reduction in earnings management. These findings also 
confirm Klein’s (2002) inference that maintaining a wholly independent audit committee may not 
be necessary.  
Third, while the earnings management literature generally uses discretionary accruals to 
proxy for opportunistic earnings management, managers can also use accruals to reveal their 
private information. Following the design in Bowen, Rajgopal, and Venkatathalam (2008), we 
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examine the association between earnings management and future performance. We find that the 
change in the extent of earnings management explained by the improvement in board 
independence is negatively correlated with future performance; that is, the larger the decrease, the 
better the future performance is. This evidence is consistent with increased board independence 
reducing the opportunistic use of earnings management when information acquisition cost is low.  
Fourth, we also examine the change in real earnings management. We find that while 
overall there is an increase in the extent of real earnings management in the post-SOX period, as 
documented in Cohen et al. (2008), non-compliance firms with low cost of information 
acquisition are less likely to experience an increase in real earnings management than compliance 
firms. Taken together, our results indicate that compared to compliance firms, non-compliance 
firms with low information acquisition cost are associated with a decrease in both accrual and real 
earnings management.  
Lastly, we conduct additional analyses to address an alternative explanation that firms with 
low information acquisition cost for outsiders, or those in a richer information environment, are 
under greater pressure to hire better qualified directors, and the difference in director 
qualifications drives the documented results. We compare the characteristics of newly appointed 
independent directors in non-compliance firms with low information acquisition cost and in non-
compliance firms with high information acquisition cost. We find that these directors have similar 
employment background and do not differ in financial expertise. We also find that these two 
groups of firms have a similar number of board meetings, a proxy for director effort. Thus, we 
find no evidence supportive of the market pressure argument.  
Our paper contributes to the literature in several important ways. First, it provides direct 
evidence on how recent regulatory reforms on board and audit committee independence affect 
financial reporting, more specifically the extent of earnings management. These regulatory 
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reforms represent unprecedented responses to several high-profile corporate scandals. Since 
earnings management is one of the main drivers of the reforms, it is important to investigate 
whether these reforms effectively curb earnings management. While Cohen et al. (2008) 
document that the passage of SOX is followed by a significant decline in accrual-based earnings 
management on average, we focus on the incremental impact of increases in board and audit 
committee independence. Thus, our paper directly examines whether and under what conditions 
these regulatory reforms are effective in reducing earnings management. Such investigations of 
the potential benefits of the regulatory reforms are important given the costs these reforms 
imposed on firms.2  
Second, our paper contributes to the broad literature on corporate governance and earnings 
management. Unlike prior studies of board structure and earnings management, we exploit an 
exogenous change in board structure.3 Such an analysis is less likely to be subject to the 
endogeneity problem, which potentially affects the analysis and inferences of prior studies. For 
example, Adams et al. (2010), Bushman (2009), and Guay (2008) argue that board independence 
and managerial discretion are endogenously determined. Under certain circumstances, it might be 
optimal to provide managers with more discretion, and more managerial discretion can lead to 
both lower board independence and higher earnings management. In contrast, in our setting, 
changes to board structure are attributed to regulatory reforms rather than unobservable firm and 
CEO characteristics. In addition, we use the difference-in-difference approach, thereby 
controlling for other economic shocks during the sample period that affect the extent of earnings 
                                                 
2 Linck et al. (2009) find that after SOX, corporate boards become larger, more independent, more diligent, and more 
accountable for corporate failures. The increased workload and risk for outside directors (leading to substantial 
increases of director fees as found in Linck et al. 2009) and the potential opportunity cost of having fewer insiders on 
the board beg the question of whether these regulatory reforms provide benefits to shareholders. Adams et al. (2010) 
thus call for research to examine the benefits as well as costs of recent corporate board reforms.  
3 While regulatory reforms are not exogenous in the sense that they are responses to corporate scandals, the 
regulatory requirements are exogenous to individual firms.  
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management in all firms. 
Lastly, our evidence sheds light on the conditions under which outside directors are 
effective in curbing earnings management. Prior research provides mixed evidence on whether 
board independence is negatively correlated with earnings management proxies. While some 
studies find consistent evidence that board independence helps reduce earnings management (e.g., 
Klein 2002), others (e.g., Vafeas 2005, Bowen et al. 2008) find an insignificant relationship 
between the two. One potential reason for the mixed evidence is that prior research generally does 
not explore the circumstances under which the monitoring of outside directors is more effective.4 
In this paper, we build on the notion that outside directors’ monitoring is enhanced by their access 
to firm-specific information. We find that the effect of board independence in reducing earnings 
management is stronger in firms where the cost for outside directors to become informed is lower. 
We also confirm this in a cross-sectional analysis of the level of earnings management; we find 
that board independence is negatively correlated with the extent of earnings management only 
when information acquisition cost is low.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the regulatory background, 
related research and our hypotheses; Section 3 describes the sample and data; Section 4 presents 
the main analyses; Section 5 reports additional analyses; and Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Background, related research and hypothesis development 
2.1 Recent regulatory reforms on board independence and audit committee  
Recent years have witnessed unprecedented regulatory changes in board structure to 
improve board oversight. Here we provide a brief summary of the changes related to board 
                                                 
4 One exception is Agrawal and Chadha (2005). They find that audit committee independence in itself does not affect 
the likelihood of accounting restatements, but having an outside accounting expert on the audit committee 
significantly reduces the likelihood of accounting restatements.  
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independence and audit committee.5 See Klein (2003) for a detailed summary and discussion.  
With respect to board independence, in 1956 the NYSE required that the listed companies 
have at least two outside directors but left the term “outside directors” more or less undefined. 
Neither the exchanges nor the regulators imposed any restrictions on the level of board 
independence until 2002, when the NYSE and NASD, in response to several highly publicized 
financial reporting failures (including Enron and WorldCom), proposed new corporate 
governance rules requiring that the board consist of a majority of independent directors. The 
criteria for independent directors are also greatly clarified. In essence, a director is independent if 
(s)he does not accept any significant compensatory fee from the firm (other than the director fee) 
and is not an affiliated person of the firm or its subsidiary. These new corporate governance rules 
were approved by the SEC in 2003.  
While there were exchange rules in place regarding audit committee independence early on, 
the most important change did not come until December 1999. For example, in 1987 the NYSE 
required that the listed companies have an audit committee consisting solely of independent 
directors, and in 1989 the NASD required that the listed companies have an audit committee with 
the majority of the members being independent. Despite these rules, the definition of independent 
directors is not entirely clear, and firms often have affiliated directors sitting on audit committees 
(Vicknair et al. 1993). Responding to calls to improve the financing reporting process, the Blue 
Ribbon Committee was set up by the NYSE and NASD in 1999 to study the role of the audit 
committee. In December 1999 the NYSE and NASD adopted the Blue Ribbon Committee’s 
recommendations; the listed companies are required to maintain an audit committee of at least 
three directors, all of whom must be independent directors, and the definition of independence is 
                                                 
5 The recent regulatory reforms of board structure also contain provisions for other committees of the board. For 
instance, the NYSE requires that listed companies have a nominating/corporate governance committee and a 
compensation committee, both composed entirely of independent directors.  
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clarified for the first time. Section 301 of the SOX of 2002 mostly parallels these exchange 
requirements and enhances these requirements by clearly spelling out the responsibilities of the 
audit committee.  
Because the regulatory reforms on audit committee independence span a longer period, the 
analysis of the change in audit committee independence is more likely to be confounded by other 
contemporaneous changes. As a result, we focus on the increase in the overall board 
independence in our main analysis and examine the increase in audit committee independence in 
an additional analysis. 
2.2 Related research  
Prior research on board independence and earnings management 
Prior research has examined the association between board independence, including audit 
committee independence, and earnings management, using various proxies of earnings 
management. Under the notion that independent directors are more effective monitors than inside 
directors, board independence is expected to be negatively correlated with the extent of earnings 
management. The same argument applies to audit committee independence. The evidence to date 
is somewhat mixed.  
Using a sample of 692 firm-years in the period 1992-1993, Klein (2002) finds that board 
and audit committee independence are both negatively correlated with earnings management, 
proxied by the absolute value of abnormal accruals. While this finding is confirmed by some later 
studies, such as Bedard et al. (2004), other studies find conflicting results.6 For example, Vafeas 
(2005) finds that board and audit committee independence are not significantly related to the 
likelihood of avoiding earnings surprises, a proxy for earnings management. Bowen et al. (2008) 
                                                 
6 Romano (2005) surveys the literature on the impact of audit committee independence on earnings management and 
finds that while six studies find a negative association, 10 others fail to find a significant association. 
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also find that the proportion of executive directors (a proxy for lack of independence) is 
negatively correlated with the absolute value of abnormal accruals. Examining accounting frauds, 
Beasley (1996) finds that board independence is negatively correlated with the likelihood of 
accounting frauds. In contrast, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) find that board and audit committee 
independence are not correlated with the likelihood of accounting restatements. Larcker et al. 
(2007) find that board independence is not correlated with signed abnormal accruals, the absolute 
value of abnormal accruals, or the likelihood of accounting restatements.  
The mixed prior evidence makes it difficult to predict whether the extent of earnings 
management will change when board independence increases following the recent regulatory 
requirements. In addition, prior studies, by examining the cross-sectional correlation between 
board independence and earnings management, are likely subject to the endogeneity issue. As 
pointed out by Guay (2008), Bushman (2009) and others, having lower board independence and 
higher earnings management can be part of the general equilibrium and does not necessarily 
indicate that board independence reduces earnings management. Using change regressions does 
not solve this issue either, since both changes in earnings management and board independence 
can be driven by some unobservable firm and CEO characteristics. Unlike the above-mentioned 
studies, we take advantage of the regulatory requirement of increases in board independence, an 
exogenous shock to the firms affected. The endogeneity problem is thus mitigated. In addition, we 
extend the literature by investigating whether the effectiveness of increases in board independence 
in reducing earnings management varies across firms, specifically whether it varies with 
information acquisition cost faced by outside directors.  
Prior research on the impact of the recent regulatory reforms of board structure 
Our paper is also related to several studies that examine the impact of the recent regulatory 
reforms of board structure. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) study the overall market reaction 
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to the rule announcements and find that firms that are not compliant with the rules prior to the 
reform (i.e., non-compliance firms) are associated with positive abnormal returns compared to 
other firms, but the positive abnormal returns only apply to large non-compliance firms. Duchin 
et al. (2010) find that firm performance improves and firm value increases after the reform for the 
non-compliance firms with low information cost, proxied by high analyst coverage (or more 
accurate analyst forecasts, or lower dispersion of analyst forecasts). Examining compensation 
practices, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) document a reduction in excessive executive 
compensation for non-compliance firms after the reforms. However, Guthrie et al. (2010) find 
that Chhaochharia and Grinstein’s results are driven by a small number of outliers; once the 
outliers are excluded, increase in board independence is not associated with a reduction in 
excessive executive compensation.  
Given that improving the effectiveness of corporate boards in overseeing financial reporting 
is one of the main objectives of the reforms, it is important to provide direct evidence on the 
impact of the board structure reforms on earnings management, the objective of our study. Our 
study is related to but distinct from Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) and Duchin et al. (2010) 
in important ways. While all three studies focus on the impact of the increase in board 
independence, the other two studies focus on overall firm performance and value and we focus on 
earnings management. This distinction is not trivial. First, the board serves both monitoring and 
advising roles. While increases in firm value can be attributed to improved board monitoring or 
advising, reductions in earnings management provide more direct support for improved board 
monitoring. Second, the findings on firm value do not necessarily generalize to individual 
corporate decisions, as shown by the mixed findings on compensation practices. Empirically, 
since earnings management proxies may be correlated with firm performance, we control for firm 
performance as well as use measures such as performance matched abnormal accruals to tease out 
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the performance effect. Lastly, our study complements Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) and 
Duchin et al. (2010) by providing concrete evidence on channels through which increases in 
board independence can enhance firm value.     
2.3 Increases in board independence and earnings management: H1 
Under the new rules, firms must have a majority of independent directors. Prior to this new 
requirement, firms had different levels of board independence. Some firms already had a majority 
independent board. The rules, therefore, did not affect them, and we refer to them as compliance 
firms. Other firms, in contrast, did not have a majority independent board prior to the regulatory 
reforms. We refer to those as non-compliance firms. Non-compliance firms have to increase their 
board independence to comply with the new rules. If independent directors are more effective 
monitors than inside directors, an increase in board independence can reduce the extent of 
earnings management.7 If this is the case, non-compliance firms are expected to have a larger 
decrease in earnings management from the pre- to the post-regulation period, compared to 
compliance firms.8 Our first hypothesis is thus stated as (in alternative form): 
H1: Compared to compliance firms, non-compliance firms experience a larger decrease in 
earnings management from the pre- to the post-regulation period.  
 
We might not find results consistent with H1 for several reasons. First, the increase in board 
independence as a response to the reform may be primarily window dressing (Romano 2005). 
Skeptics of recent reforms argue that managers may select directors who can be classified as 
independent based on regulatory definitions but are still sympathetic to the management. Second, 
                                                 
7 While the audit committee oversees the financial reporting process (reviewing the financial statements, audit 
process and internal control, and serving as the arbiter between the management and external auditor), audit 
committee members are nominated by the board and the audit committee reports to the board (e.g., Klein 2002; 
Charan 2005). Thus, it is expected that the board has power over the financial reporting process. 
8 Compliance firms might experience a change in earnings management due to the change in macroeconomic 
conditions. For example, Cohen et al. (2008) document an average decrease in accrual-based earnings management 
after the passage of SOX. We use compliance firms as the control group to control for these contemporaneous 
changes. 
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the outside directors’ monitoring role might be hindered by their lack of information. For 
example, Adams and Ferreira (2007) argue that “unless boards are given better access to 
information, simply increasing board independence is not sufficient to improve governance.” 
Below we discuss the information issue and develop our second hypothesis.  
2.4 Information problems of independent directors: H2 
By their nature, independent directors have less information than managers. While having 
access to the management for information, independent directors might have difficulty obtaining 
necessary information for monitoring purposes. Adams and Ferrira (2007) and Harris and Raviv 
(2008) analytically show that knowing that independent directors are tougher monitors, the 
management is reluctant to share important information with them or a board dominated by 
independent directors.  
The information concern is shared by both academia and directors. For example, Jensen 
(1993, p. 864) states that “the CEO almost always determines the agenda and information given to 
the board. This limitation on information severely hinders the ability of even highly talented 
board members to contribute effectively to the monitoring and evaluation of the CEO and the 
company’s strategy.” The surveys conducted by KPMG in 2004 and 2010 indicate that about half 
of the audit committee members rate the information prepared by the management before the 
committee meeting to be of moderate or low quality and that audit committee members often have 
to cultivate relationships with managers in order to obtain useful information. Most of the 
surveyed board members responded that one of the most important ways to improve board 
effectiveness is to improve the information they have.9  
A good illustration of the information problem is Enron’s board before its collapse. Based 
                                                 
9 Specifically, the top-ranked suggestions by the surveyed board members include (1) improved committee agendas 
(e.g., higher quality and more timely pre-meeting materials, having more dynamic and open dialogues, etc.), and (2) 
better information flow (e.g., higher quality, a variety of sources, and more internal transparency). 
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on conventional definitions, Enron’s board consisted of a majority of independent directors, and 
all members of the audit committee were independent financial experts. However, those outside 
directors did not seem to have enough information. They mostly relied on Enron’s management 
and Arthur Anderson for information and did not learn about some key events until it was too 
late. For example, they did not learn about the whistle blower’s letter regarding Raptors until one 
year later, and even then the board was told that, based on the firm’s preliminary investigation, 
the employee’s concerns did not warrant further investigation. As another example, outside 
directors learned about Raptors’ impact on Enron’s shareholder equity (a reduction of $1.2 
billion) not from the management, but from a Wall Street Journal article.10 
In a case study of a large company, Johanson (2007) finds that the board of directors relies 
heavily on other information sources (including public sources), which are equally important, if 
not more important than, the information obtained from managers.11 Prior research (e.g., Raheja 
2005; Adams and Ferrira 2007; Harris and Raviv 2008; Duchin et al. 2010) demonstrates that the 
effectiveness of outside directors as monitors is greater when the cost of information acquisition 
is lower. It thus follows that the more informative the information environment is, the lower the 
information acquisition costs are, and the more effective the outside directors will be. 
In summary, the above discussion indicates that independent directors might not have 
enough information from managers to be effective monitors and they will be more effective 
monitors when they face lower information acquisition costs. If this is the case, non-compliance 
firms with lower information acquisition cost should experience a greater decrease in earnings 
                                                 
10 For details, see the report prepared by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on 
Governmental Affairs of the United States Senate (Report 107-70), “The Role of the Board of Directors in Enron’s 
Collapse.” 
11 This is consistent with our private conversations with several directors, who indicate that they periodically obtain 
information from various sources (including public sources) other than management prior to board meetings. De 
Franco et al. (2010) also argue that outside directors are more informed and effective monitors when firms make 
more public disclosures. 
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management from the pre- to the post-regulation period than other non-compliance firms. Thus, 
our second hypothesis is (stated in alternative form): 
H2: Compared to other non-compliance firms, non-compliance firms with low information 
acquisition cost experience a greater decrease in earnings management from the pre- 
to the post-regulation period.  
 
We discuss the proxies for information acquisition costs in Section 3.4. 
 
3. Sample and data 
3.1 Sample selection and the measurement of earnings management 
As mentioned earlier, we use the year 2000 as the pre-regulation benchmark year and 2005 
as the post-regulation year. The rule of majority board independence was adopted in 2002, and 
firms are required to comply with it no later than the end of 2004.12 As in prior studies (e.g., 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2009; Duchin et al. 2010), we find that firms responded to the new 
regulations by increasing the representation of independent directors on their boards over time. 
Board independence was stable in the years leading up to 2000, started to increase after 2000, and 
became stable again after 2005.  
We obtain information on the structure of boards from the Investor Responsibility Research 
Center (IRRC). We start with a sample of 1,755 firms that have board information in 2000 from 
IRRC. We further require that the sample firms have financial information from Compustat and 
stock price information from CRSP for the pre- and post-regulation period. This reduces the 
sample size to 1,205 firms.13  
Following prior studies (e.g., Klein 2002; Yu 2008; Cohen et al. 2008), we measure the 
                                                 
12 Firms with classified boards are given one extra year for adoption. By the end of 2005, all relevant regulations were 
adopted and phased in. Our results are robust to moving the pre-regulation year one year back or the post-regulation 
year one year forward.  
13 All the sample firms have board structure information in 2000 from IRRC. Some sample firms have missing board 
information in 2005 from IRRC. For these firms, we hand collect their board information in 2005 from proxy 
statements.  
16 
 
extent of earnings management using the absolute value of discretionary accruals (|DA|) estimated 
from the modified cross-sectional Jones model. The model is estimated every year for each Fama-
French industry that has at least ten observations in the Compustat population. We find 
quantitatively similar results when using performance-matched discretionary accruals (Kothari et 
al. 2005). To ensure that our results are not driven by a particular year, we compare the average 
|DA| between the pre-regulation period, the three years centered on 2000, and the post-regulation 
period, the three years centered on 2005. The results, based on the comparison between 2000 and 
2005, are quantitatively similar.  
3.2 Overall changes in board and audit committee independence  
Figures 1A and 1B present the change in the independence of the board and audit 
committee, respectively, for our sample firms from 1998 to 2006. We rely on the IRRC definition 
of independent directors; a director is independent if he or she is neither affiliated nor currently an 
employee of the company.14 Figure 1A shows that the mean board independence rises from 
around 60 percent in 1998 to roughly 71 percent in 2006 and that the percentage of firms with a 
majority independent board (i.e., more than 50 percent of board members are independent 
directors) increases from 68 percent to around 88 percent in the same period. These results show 
that firms increase the representation of independent directors on their boards in response to the 
recent regulations. The size of the board is relatively stable over this period; the mean number of 
directors on the board is 9.5 (untabulated).15  
Figure 1B shows that audit committees also become more independent over time. However, 
while the increase in board independence mainly occurs in the period 2000-2005, justifying our 
                                                 
14 According to the IRRC, affiliated directors include those who are former employees of the company, providers of 
professional services to the company, customers or suppliers of the company, or family members of an employee.  
15 Non-compliance firms can increase board independence by (i) hiring new independent directors and/or (ii) retiring 
old affiliated or inside directors. Our analyses of the board structure data and readings of companies’ proxy 
statements suggest that most non-compliance firms do both. The resulting change in the average board size is a small, 
insignificant increase for our sample.  
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choice of using 2000 and 2005 as the pre- and post-regulation years, the percentage of firms with 
a 100 percent independent audit committee increases steadily and gradually from 1998 to 2006. 
This is likely due to the longer span of audit committee reform.  
3.3 Compliance vs. non-compliance firms  
As mentioned earlier, we separate firms based on whether they satisfied the regulatory 
requirement of majority board independence in 2000. Firms that did not have a majority 
independent board in 2000 are referred to as non-compliance firms, and the other firms are 
referred to as compliance firms. Of the 1,205 firms in our sample, 385 are classified as non-
compliance firms and 820 as compliance firms. Since non-compliance firms are required to 
increase board independence, we use the non-compliance indicator as an instrument for increases 
in board independence as a response to the reform.16 This variable is highly correlated with the ex 
post increase in board independence, and at the same time has the advantage of being exogenous 
to our dependent variable of interest, ex post change in earnings management.  
Table 1 presents the change in board independence over time for compliance and non-
compliance firms. Compliance firms’ board independence increases modestly from 2000 to 2005; 
the percentage of independent directors increases from 72.01 percent to 76.56 percent. The 
percentage of firms with a majority independent board experiences a small decrease, from 100 
percent (by construction) to about 96.59 percent. In contrast, for non-compliance firms, the 
percentage of independent directors increases from 38.41 percent to 60.24 percent and the 
percentage of firms with a majority independent board increases from 0 percent (again by 
                                                 
16 If more than 50 percent of a firm’s voting power is held by an individual, a group of individuals who agree to vote 
together, or another company, the firm is classified as a controlled firm and is exempt from the exchange requirement 
that the board include a majority of independent directors. In our sample, 62 firms can be classified as a controlled 
firm. Our reading of proxy statements suggests that most of the controlled firms that did not comply with the board 
majority independence requirement prior to the reform voluntarily choose to comply with it afterwards. In an 
untabulated analysis, we exclude the controlled firms and obtain very similar results.  
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construction) to 74.29 percent.17  
3.4 Proxies for information acquisition cost 
Following prior research (e.g., Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 1999; Duchin et al. 2010), 
we use analyst coverage as the proxy for information acquisition cost in the main tests. In the 
sensitivity tests, we obtain similar results when using alternative proxies for information 
acquisition cost. See Section 4.3 for details.  
It is well-established in the literature that analyst coverage is positively correlated with the 
richness of information environment (e.g., Healy and Palepu 2001). Financial analysts help 
increase the amount of information available to investors and also tend to follow firms with rich 
information environment.18 Prior research finds that firms well covered by analysts have a more 
active investment community, greater press coverage, lower information asymmetry, and less 
mispricing (e.g., Brennan et al. 1993; Walther 1997; Easley et al. 1998; Hong et al. 2000; Elgers 
et al. 2001; Griffin and Lemmon 2002). This line of research motivates the use of analyst 
coverage as a proxy for the ability of outsiders, including outside directors, to obtain firm-specific 
information (e.g., Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 1999; Duchin et al. 2010).  
We obtain analyst coverage information from I/B/E/S. Analyst coverage is measured as the 
number of unique analysts who issue earnings forecasts in 2000. To reduce the effect of extreme 
                                                 
17 We examine firms’ proxy statements to understand why some firms did not comply with the requirement by 2005, 
according to the IRRC. We find that this is largely driven by the difference in the definition of independent directors 
between the company and IRRC; the IRRC’s definition tends to be stricter. In some cases, while the company applies 
the rule literately, the IRRC uses stricter criteria. For example, according to exchanges, past employees can be 
classified as independent directors if they did not work for the company in the last three years. However, the IRRC 
classifies all past employees as affiliated directors. In other cases, the company applies the rule loosely (if correctly). 
For example, some companies classify past employees who were employed two years ago, family members of 
executives, or directors with business relationships with the firm as independent directors, arguing that these 
relationships do not interfere with such directors’ judgment. The IRRC classifies all such directors as affiliated 
directors.   
18 We are agnostic about the causality between analyst coverage and the richness of information environment; instead 
we focus on the positive association between them. On one hand, financial analysts generate more information that 
can help outsiders evaluate the firms, including firms’ potential earnings management. For example, Dyck, Morse 
and Zingales (2010) find that analysts are the most frequent whistleblowers for corporate frauds. Yu (2008) finds that 
high analyst coverage helps reduce the extent of earnings management. On the other hand, financial analysts also tend 
to follow firms with more investor interest and lower information acquisition costs (e.g., O’Brien and Bhushan 1990).  
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values, we follow prior research (e.g., Bowen, Chen, and Cheng 2008) and use the log 
transformation of analyst coverage in regressions. We use analyst coverage in 2000 because it is 
an ex ante measure, not affected by ex post change in earnings management. Nevertheless, we 
find similar results when we use analyst coverage in 2005. Our variable of interest is the 
interaction of the non-compliance firm indicator and analyst coverage. We control for the level of 
and change in analyst coverage in the regressions to capture any main effect analyst coverage has 
on earnings management (e.g., Yu 2008).  
 
4. Empirical analyses 
4.1 Testing H1: Increases in board independence and changes in earnings management 
4.1.1 Research design 
To test hypothesis H1, we regress the change in the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
(|DA|) from the pre-regulation period (1999-2001) to the post-regulation period (2004-2006) on 
the non-compliance indicator and control variables:  
∆|ܦܣ| ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܰ݋݊_ܥ݋݉݌݈݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ ൅ ࢼܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ ൅ ߝ     (1) 
 
Non-Compliance is set as 1 for non-compliance firms and 0 otherwise. The intercept, α0, captures 
the average change in |DA| for compliance firms with zero values of control variables. The 
coefficient on Non-Compliance, α1, captures the incremental change in |DA| for non-compliance 
firms. Hypothesis H1 predicts α1 to be negative.  
We include the following variables to control for firm characteristics that may affect the 
magnitude of DA: institutional ownership (INST), return on asset (ROA), market-to-book ratio 
(M/B), firm size (Size), debt/equity financing (Financing), leverage (LEV), and analyst coverage 
(AC). These are the commonly used variables in the earnings management literature, and to save 
space, we discuss their measurement in the Appendix, Panel A and the rationale for including 
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them as controls in Panel B. To be consistent with the measurement of the dependent variable 
(i.e., changes), we use as controls the change in these variables between 2000 and 2005. We also 
include industry fixed effects to control for the variation in the change in |DA| across industries.19, 
20  
4.1.2 Descriptive statistics  
Table 2 reports firm characteristics for the pre-regulation year (i.e., 2000) and post-
regulation year (i.e., 2005). We also present the statistical tests of the differences between the two 
years. Panel A presents the statistics for the full sample. Consistent with Cohen et al. (2008), 
Panel A shows that the mean (median) of three-year average of the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals (|DA|) experiences a significant decrease, from 0.084 (0.058) in the pre-regulation period 
to 0.057 (0.042) in the post-regulation period. Our sample firms are well followed by analysts. 
These firms have a mean (median) of 13 (10) analysts following in 2000 and 13 (11) analysts in 
2005. We find that our sample firms have stable performance, measured as ROA, over the period. 
On the other hand, these firms have a significant increase in institutional ownership and firm size 
and a significant decrease in the market-to-book ratio, frequency of financing activities and 
leverage. Panels B and C show that these patterns apply to both compliance and non-compliance 
firms.  
Panel D reports the Pearson correlations among the key variables. Δ|DA| is insignificantly 
correlated with the non-compliance indicator, negatively correlated with the change in ROA and 
leverage, and positively correlated with the change in firm size. The correlations among 
                                                 
19 The industry composition is similar between compliance and non-compliance firms except that there are relatively 
more compliance firms in machinery and utility industries and relatively more non-compliance firms in 
pharmaceutical and telecommunication industries. The results are robust to excluding these industries.  
20 In a sensitivity test, we include the lagged change in |DA|, measured as the difference in |DA| between 1999 and 
2000, to control for potential mean reversion of |DA|, and we find that our inferences remain the same. In a separate 
sensitivity test, we control for the volatility of earnings, cash flows, and returns, and find similar results. Due to data 
availability issues, we do not include these variables in the main test. We also get similar results when we replace 
ROA by cash flows from operations.  
21 
 
independent variables are generally small, except that between the change in analyst coverage and 
institutional ownership (0.465, significant at the 0.001 level). 
4.1.3 Regression results 
Column (1) of Table 3 reports the regression results. The intercept is significantly negative, 
suggesting that compliance firms experience a decrease in the extent of earnings management 
during our sample period, consistent with the time trend reported in Cohen et al. (2008). The 
coefficient on the Non_Compliance indicator is negative but is not significantly different from 
zero at conventional levels. That is, compared to compliance firms, non-compliance firms do not 
experience any incremental decrease in earnings management. This result is consistent with the 
mixed evidence presented in the prior literature and indicates that the recent regulatory 
requirement of increasing board independence on average is ineffective in reducing earnings 
management.  
The assumption behind the definition of Non_Compliance is that non-compliance firms in 
2000 are expected to increase board independence, as required by the regulation. As shown in 
Table 1, not all non-compliance firms became compliant in 2005; in fact, 26 percent of the non-
compliance firms still did not have a majority independent board by 2005, according to IRRC 
definitions. Thus, the above insignificant results might be driven by firms that do not improve 
board independence. To address this issue, we refine the non-compliance indicator: the indicator 
variable Non_Compliance is set as 1 if the firm did not have a majority independent board in 2000 
but had one in 2005. Under this definition, there are 286 firms with Non_Compliance equal to 
one. Column (2) of Table 3 reports the results using this refined definition of Non_Compliance. 
The results are similar. 
With respect to control variables, we find that firms with an increase in performance or 
leverage have a larger decrease in |DA|, and firms with an increase in firm size have an increase in 
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|DA|. Other control variables are not significant.  
In summary, the results in Table 3 indicate that while, on average, firms experience a 
reduction in |DA| over our sample period, non-compliance firms do not experience an incremental 
decrease in the extent of earnings management despite their increases in board independence.  
4.2 Testing H2: The role of information access  
To test hypothesis H2, we add analyst coverage and its interaction with the non-compliance 
indicator to equation (1):  
∆|ܦܣ| ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܰ݋݊_ܥ݋݉݌݈݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ ൅ ߙଶܰ݋݊_ܥ݋݉݌݈݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ ൈ ܣܥ ൅ ߙଷܣܥ ൅ ࢼܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ ൅ ߝ (2) 
 
The coefficient on the non-compliance indicator, α1, captures the incremental change in |DA| for 
non-compliance firms that had no analysts following. The coefficient on the interaction term, α2, 
captures the impact of analyst coverage on the effect of increased board independence on earnings 
management. Hypothesis H2 predicts α2 to be negative.  
Table 4, Panel A reports the regression results. The coefficient on Non_Compliance is 
positive, suggesting that compared to compliance firms, non-compliance firms without analysts 
following actually experience a smaller decrease in |DA|. F-tests (untabulated) indicate that the 
net change in |DA| for non-compliance firms without analysts following is insignificantly 
different from zero. More importantly, the coefficient on the interaction term of Non_Compliance 
and analyst coverage is negative, significant at the 0.01 level (all p-values are based on two-sided 
t-tests). This result indicates that the decrease in earnings management for non-compliance firms 
increases with analyst coverage. This is consistent with H2 that increased board independence 
reduces earnings management when independent directors face lower information acquisition 
cost.  
The coefficient on analyst coverage, α3, captures the effect of analyst coverage on the 
change in |DA| for compliance firms. While Yu (2008) finds that analyst coverage is negatively 
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correlated with |DA|, we do not expect analyst coverage to be associated with the change in |DA|. 
Indeed, the coefficient on analyst coverage is insignificant. On the other hand, the change in AC 
is significantly negatively correlated with the change in |DA|, consistent with Yu’s (2008) 
inference that analyst coverage can help reduce earnings management. The results on control 
variables are similar to those reported in Table 3.  
To further shed light on the impact of increased board independence on earnings 
management for firms with different levels of information acquisition cost, instead of using a 
continuous variable of analyst coverage, we use two dummy variables: Low_AC (an indicator for 
firms with analyst coverage lower than the sample median) and High_AC (an indicator for firms 
with analyst coverage higher than the sample median). In the regressions, we include the 
interaction of these two dummies with the non-compliance indicator, as follows: 
∆|ܦܣ| ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܰ݋݊_ܥ݋݉݌݈݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ ൈ ܮ݋ݓ_ܣܥ ൅ ߙଶܰ݋݊_ܥ݋݉݌݈݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ ൈ ܪ݄݅݃_ܣܥ 
൅ ߙଷܪ݄݅݃_ܣܥ ൅ ࢼܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ ൅ ߝ       (3) 
In this regression, coefficient α1 (α2, α3) captures the incremental change in |DA| for non-
compliance firms with low analyst coverage (non-compliance firms with high analyst coverage, 
compliance firms with high analyst coverage) over compliance firms with low analyst coverage. 
Panel B of Table 4 reports the regression results. We find that while α1 is insignificantly different 
from zero, α2 is significantly negative. These findings indicate that the recent regulatory change 
of increasing board independence is effective in reducing earnings management incrementally 
only for non-compliance firms with high analyst coverage and low information acquisition cost.21  
In summary, our analyses indicate that consistent with H2, firms with improved board 
independence are associated with a reduction in earnings management only when independent 
                                                 
21 In an untabulated analysis, we find that non-compliance firms with high analyst coverage have a similar level of 
board independence as non-compliance firms with low analyst coverage in both 2000 and 2005. Thus, the observed 
results are not driven by the difference in the level of or the change in board independence between these two groups.  
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directors have easy access to information.  
4.3 Alternative proxies of information acquisition cost – information transparency and same 
industry independent director  
The main analysis reported above uses analyst coverage to proxy for the information 
acquisition cost for independent directors. In an untabulated analysis, we follow prior research 
(e.g., Hong et al. 2000; Yu 2008) and use residual analyst coverage - the residual from a 
regression of analyst coverage on firm size - in the analyses and we find similar results. We also 
use firm size as proxy for information access and obtain similar results.  
To further ensure the robustness of the results, we replicate the main analyses using another 
two alternative proxies for information acquisition costs. First, we use a comprehensive measure 
of information transparency between managers and outsiders. Following Anderson et al. (2009) 
and others, we construct an aggregate measure based on the following four proxies: (1) turnover – 
average daily trading volume scaled by total number of shares outstanding, (2) average bid-ask 
spread over the year –the difference between bid price and ask price scaled by the average of the 
two, (3) analyst coverage, and (4) forecast error – the absolute value of the difference between 
actual EPS and the consensus analyst forecast before earnings announcement, scaled by stock 
price. We add up the decile ranks of these four variables (reverse ranks for bid-ask spread and 
forecast error) and then standardize it to the range [0, 1]. The transparency measure is constructed 
based on data in 2000. Using the measure based on data in 2005 leads to similar results. A high 
value implies a more transparent information environment and lower information acquisition cost. 
We then replace the analyst coverage variable in the main analyses with this transparency score.  
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Column (1) of Table 5 reports the results.22 As indicated in the table, while non-
compliance firms with the most opaque information environments experience an increase in the 
extent of earnings management compared to compliance firms, non-compliance firms with more 
transparent information environments experience a decrease in earnings management compared to 
compliance firms, consistent with the main tests.  
The second proxy is based on the industry expertise of independent directors. We argue 
that independent directors working in the same industry are more knowledgeable about the 
industry and thus have lower cost of acquiring and understanding information about the firm.23 
We expect that non-compliance firms with the same industry executives as independent directors 
will experience a larger decrease in |DA| than other non-compliance firms. Accordingly, we 
construct an indicator variable, Director_Same_Ind, defined as one for those firms with one or 
more independent directors who are high-level executives in the same industry as the firm, and 
zero otherwise. High-level executives are identified from the ExecuComp and insider trading 
databases. We use Fama and French (1997) industry classifications. We measure this variable in 
2005, since board independence increases over the sample period. In our sample, there are 228 
firms with Director_Same_Ind equal to one. Column (2) of Table 5 reports the regression results 
using this alternative proxy of information acquisition cost. As reported in the table, our main 
inferences remain the same. Compared to compliance firms, non-compliance firms without the 
same industry executives as independent directors do not experience a significant incremental 
change in |DA|. However, non-compliance firms with same industry executives as independent 
directors experience an incremental decrease in |DA|, significant at the 0.01 level. 
                                                 
22 To save space, we only tabulate results using non-compliance indicator defined based on 2000 and 2005 
information. The results are very similar when using non-compliance indicator defined based on 2000 information.   
23 In addition, these same industry independent directors can disseminate their knowledge and information to other 
independent directors on the board, and the monitoring effectiveness of the overall board is thus enhanced. 
26 
 
Overall, the results in this subsection confirm our inference that non-compliance firms 
with lower information acquisition cost experience a larger decrease in |DA| than control firms.  
 
5. Additional analyses 
5.1 How non-compliance firms increase board independence and changes in earnings 
management and 
In this section, we explore whether the approaches used by non-compliance firms to 
increase board independence affect the change in earnings management. Since board 
independence is defined as the ratio of the number of independent directors over total number of 
directors, a non-compliance firm can increase this ratio by (1) adding new independent directors, 
or (2) removing old insider/affiliated directors, or doing both. We expect our main finding to be 
stronger for non-compliance firms that have added new independent directors than for those that 
have removed old non-independent directors for two reasons. First, bringing in new independent 
directors arguably enhances board monitoring more than simply removing old directors as the 
new independent directors are more likely to be independent and likely bring new perspectives. 
Second, since newly added directors are usually not as well informed about the firm as other 
directors, having easy access to information should matter more for new directors. 
We compare the composition of the board in 2000 and 2005 for non-compliance firms 
with majority independent board in 2005. We find that 261 firms added new independent 
directors and 244 firms dropped non-independent directors (there is a large overlap between the 
two sets; 219 firms did both.) To capture the unique impact of each approach, we construct two 
indicators: Non_Compliance_Add for non-compliance firms adding independent directors and 
Non_Compliance_Drop for non-compliance firms dropping non-independent directors. We then 
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replace the non-compliance dummy in equation (2) with these two indicators and rerun the 
regression. The results are reported in Table 6.  
We find that, consistent with our expectations, the main finding only holds for those non-
compliance firms that have added new independent directors.  The interaction of 
Non_Compliance_Add and analyst coverage is significantly negative. In contrast, the interaction 
of Non_Compliance_Drop and analyst coverage is insignificant. Interestingly, the main effect of 
Non_Compliance_Drop is significantly positive. That is, if non-compliance firms only remove 
old non-independent directors, they actually experience a smaller reduction in earnings 
management compared to control firms, suggesting that this approach is unlikely to enhance 
board monitoring.     
Overall, the analyses indicate that after the board structure reform, non-compliance firms 
that have low information acquisition cost and added new independent directors are associated 
with reductions in earnings management. That is, both enhanced monitoring and information 
access are keys to reducing earnings management.  
5.2 Increases in audit committee independence and earnings management  
The above analyses examine the impact of the requirement of increasing board 
independence. Another important requirement of the recent regulatory reforms is that audit 
committees should be 100 percent independent. In this section, we investigate whether this 
requirement is effective in reducing earnings management. For this purpose, we define the non-
compliance indicator as one for firms that did not have a fully independent audit committee in 
2000 but had a fully independent committee in 2005, and zero otherwise. We then use the same 
research design to compare the change in |DA| between non-compliance and compliance firms. 
Column (1) of Table 7 reports the regression results. While the intercept is significantly 
negative, the coefficients on the non-compliance indicator and its interaction with analyst 
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coverage are not significantly different from zero. This seems to suggest that the regulatory 
requirement of a 100 percent independent audit committee is not effective in reducing earnings 
management, consistent with the finding in Klein (2002).  
However, as argued by Klein (2002), an audit committee does not need to be wholly 
independent to be effective. It thus follows that if the new requirement has any impact, it should 
be more detectable for firms with a relatively less independent audit committee to start with. 
Therefore, we redefine the non-compliance indicator as one if the independence level of the audit 
committee is lower than 67 percent in 2000 and is 100 percent in 2005, zero otherwise.24 The 
regression results are reported in Column (2) of Table 7. The intercept is significantly negative, 
and the interaction term between the non-compliance indicator and analyst coverage is 
significantly negative. 
Overall, the analyses suggest that the recent requirement of increasing audit committee 
independence is effective in reducing earnings management for firms that had good information 
environment and a relatively low level of audit committee independence to start with. This 
confirms the important role of information access in facilitating independent directors’ 
monitoring. 25  
5.3 Earnings management: efficiency or opportunism 
One underlying assumption of the above inferences, as well as in prior research on board 
independence and earnings management such as Klein (2002), is that |DA| proxies for 
                                                 
24 Most firms have either three or four members on their audit committees. If a firm has a three-member audit 
committee and two members are independent in 2000, the firm is classified as a non-compliance firm, assuming the 
firm has a 100 percent independent audit committee in 2005. If a firm has a four-member audit committee and three 
members are independent in 2000, the firm is classified as a compliance firm. We obtain similar results if we require 
the independence level of the audit committee in 2005 to be higher than 67 percent, or if we use other cutoff points 
such as 75 percent. 
25 In an untabulated analysis, we include a non-compliance indicator based on board independence level and an 
indicator based on audit committee independence level, as well as their interactions with analyst coverage. We find 
that the results for board independence continue to hold, but the results for audit committee independence become 
weaker. This is consistent with board-level attributes being important in enhancing monitoring.  
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opportunistic earnings management. However, managers can also engage in accrual management 
to reveal private information to the market (e.g., Guay et al. 1996; Subramanyam 1996). To the 
extent that improved board monitoring does not reduce such use of accruals, this alternative 
interpretation of |DA| will not affect our inferences.  
Nonetheless, to further ensure that our interpretation is consistent with the reduction in 
opportunistic earnings management, we follow the research design in Bowen, Rajgopal and 
Venkatathalam (2008) and examine the association between the change in |DA| that is predicted 
by increased board independence and future performance. If the predicted decrease in |DA| 
represents a reduction in opportunistic earnings management, firm performance will improve in 
the future. If so, we would expect a negative correlation between the predicted change in |DA| and 
future performance; that is, the larger the decrease in |DA|, the higher the future performance. 
We measure change in |DA| explained by increased board independence as the sum of the 
product of Non-Compliance, AC, Non-Compliance ൈAC and their respective coefficient estimates 
as reported in Panel A, Column (1) of Table 4. The research design follows Bowen et al. (2008); 
we measure future performance using future cash flow from operations and future return on assets 
and use similar control variables.  
We report the regression results in Table 8. Consistent with a reduction in opportunistic 
earnings management, we find that the predicted change in |DA| is negatively correlated with 
future performance. The coefficient on the predicted change in |DA| is significantly negative at 
the 0.01 level when explaining both future ROA and future CFO. As in prior research, we find 
that the standard deviation of the performance measure is negatively correlated with future 
performance, and lagged performance and firm size are positively correlated with future 
performance. In untabulated analyses, we also control for the level of |DA| in the post-regulation 
period. Our inferences remain the same.  
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In sum, the results in this section indicate that the decrease in |DA| experienced by non-
compliance firms with low information acquisition cost is consistent with a reduction in 
opportunistic earnings management and an improvement in board monitoring. 
5.4 Increases in board independence and change in real earnings management 
In this section we investigate whether the increase in board independence has any impact on 
the extent of real earnings management. Because managers can manage earnings via both accruals 
and real transactions, this investigation can shed light on the overall effect on earnings 
management of the regulatory reform of board independence. Ex ante it is unclear whether 
independent directors can effectively monitor real earnings management because managers have 
better information and expertise to evaluate whether an economic transaction makes sense or not. 
Indeed, the associated difficulty of detecting real earnings management potentially underlies the 
increasing trend in real earnings management after the SOX, as documented in Cohen et al. 
(2008). 
Following Roychowdhury (2006), we use abnormal levels of cash flow from operations, 
production costs (cost of goods sold and change in inventory), and discretionary expenses 
(advertising, R&D, and SG&A) to capture real earnings management. The normal level of these 
variables is estimated as a function of sales, change in sales, and lagged change in sales based on 
industry-year level regressions. As in the accrual-based earnings management analysis above, we 
use the absolute value of the residuals as proxies for the extent of real earnings management and 
use the same model specification as equation (2). To capture the overall extent of real earnings 
management, we calculate an aggregate real earnings management proxy, the sum of the 
standardized values of the three individual proxies (i.e., scaled by their corresponding standard 
deviation). We compare the average real earnings management proxies between the pre-regulation 
period (1999-2001) and the post-regulation period (2004-2006).  
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Table 9 reports the regression results. The intercept is insignificant for the three individual 
proxies but significantly positive for the aggregate measure, indicating that compliance firms have 
an increased level of real earnings management in the post-regulation period, consistent with 
Cohen et al. (2008). The non-compliance dummy has a significantly positive coefficient, except 
when using the proxy based on production cost, indicating that non-compliance firms without 
analysts following are associated with an incremental increase in the extent of real earnings 
management. More importantly, we find a significantly negative coefficient on the interaction 
term between the non-compliance dummy and analyst coverage, indicating that the increase in 
real earnings management is smaller for non-compliance firms followed by more analysts. 
Overall, these results are consistent with an increase in real earnings management in the 
post-SOX period. However, non-compliance firms with high analyst coverage and low 
information acquisition cost are less likely to experience an increase in real earnings management. 
Taken together, the results reported in this section and those in Section 4 indicate that non-
compliance firms with high information acquisition cost, despite their increase in board 
independence, do not experience decreases in accrual or real earnings management relative to 
compliance firms. In contrast, non-compliance firms with low information acquisition cost 
experience decreases in both accrual and real earnings management compared to compliance 
firms.  
5.5 Alternative explanations: information access or market pressure  
An alternative explanation for the documented results is that information environment may 
proxy for market pressure. Firms with a richer information environment are typically bigger and 
more visible and have a higher level of institutional ownership. For these firms, the market 
pressure to adhere to the spirit of the regulatory requirements is therefore stronger. It thus follows 
that when picking new independent directors as a response to the regulatory requirement, non-
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compliance firms with richer information environments likely pick directors who have more 
expertise and are thus more effective monitors, compared to non-compliance firms with poorer 
information environments.  
To test whether this explanation holds, we collect information on the characteristics of the 
newly appointed directors for non-compliance firms. We find that the newly elected directors in 
non-compliance firms with high analyst coverage (585 new directors) are similar to those in non-
compliance firms with low analyst coverage (532 new directors) in all dimensions, including age, 
employment background (senior executives or not, the number of firms worked for in the past, 
and retired or not), and financial expertise (accounting, CEO, and investment banking 
background). We also find that these two groups of firms have a similar number of board 
meetings, a proxy for director effort. Based on the above information, we conclude that the results 
documented in this paper are not driven by the differences in the selection of independent 
directors in non-compliance firms with low and high information acquisition cost. 
5.6 Level regressions of earnings management and board independence in 2000 
As discussed above, prior research on the impact of board independence on earnings 
management provides mixed evidence. While examining the effectiveness of recent regulatory 
reforms in reducing earnings management, our analysis also contributes to prior literature by 
providing evidence that outside directors’ monitoring increases with their information access. In 
this section, we examine whether this inference holds in a level regression. Specifically, we 
estimate the following regression in 2000:  
|ܦܣ| ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܯ݆ܽ݋ݎ݅ݐݕܫ݊݀ ൅ ߙଶܯ݆ܽ݋ݎ݅ݐݕܫ݊݀ ൈ ܣܥ ൅ ࢼܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ ൅ ߝ   (6) 
 
In this regression, for ease of interpretation, we use a dummy variable, MajorityInd, to indicate 
firms with board independence higher than 50 percent. The list of control variables is the same as 
before, except that we use the level of control variables in 2000 instead of their changes from 
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2000 to 2005.  
Table 10 reports the regression results, first the regression without the interaction variable 
and then the full model. As reported in the table, when not including the interaction variable, 
firms with high board independence are associated with a lower level of earnings management. 
The coefficient on MajorityInd is significantly negative (t=-1.86). More importantly, after we add 
the interaction between MajorityInd and analyst coverage, while the main effect of board 
independence is insignificant, the interaction term has a significantly negative coefficient (t= -
2.77). This result confirms our inference that board independence can reduce earnings 
management only when information acquisition cost is low in a level regression. 
5.7 Robustness checks 
5.7.1 Using actual change in board independence rather than the non-compliance dummy 
In the above analyses, we use a non-compliance dummy as an instrument for the ex post 
change in board independence to address the potential endogeneity issue and/or correlated omitted 
variable issue (e.g., other changes in the sample period that affect both the structure of the board 
and the extent of earnings management). In a sensitivity test, we check the robustness of our 
results using the ex post change in board independence. We replicate the results in Panel A of 
Table 4 by replacing the non-compliance dummy with actual changes in board independence from 
2000 to 2005 and we find that the inferences are the same. For the sake of space, we do not 
tabulate the results.  
5.7.2 Using alternative earnings management proxies: Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) measure of 
earnings quality and performance-matched discretionary accurals 
To ensure that our results are robust to alternative measures of earnings 
quality/management, we conduct an additional analysis using Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) 
measure of earnings quality (DD). Following prior research (e.g., Francis et al. 2005; Jones et al. 
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2008), we measure DD as the residual from the cross-sectional regression of working capital 
accruals on past, current and future cash flows from operations. The regression is estimated 
separately for each industry-year, where industry is defined as in Fama and French (1997). The 
inferences are very similar: the interaction term of the non-compliance dummy and analyst 
coverage has a significantly negative coefficient in each model specification. We also use 
performance-matched discretionary accruals and obtain similar results.  
5.7.3 Using the likelihood of restatements as proxy for earnings management  
Another commonly used proxy for earnings management is the likelihood of accounting 
restatements. However, this proxy is inappropriate in this setting. First, the nature of restatements 
is different in the post-SOX period than in the pre-SOX period. Recent studies (Plumlee and 
Yohn 2008; Scholz 2008; DeFond 2010) argue that post-SOX restatements largely result from the 
confusion over the interpretation of new accounting standards and have little impact on firm 
value. Second, we find that firms with restatements in the pre-SOX period, particularly 
accounting irregularities as classified in Hennes et al. (2008), are unlikely to have restatements in 
the post-SOX period.26 Thus, practically, one cannot use the change specification to study the 
impact of change in board independence on the change in the likelihood of restatement. Lastly, 
prior research (e.g., Dyck et al. 2010) finds that analyst coverage can increase the likelihood of 
accounting frauds being detected. One can make similar arguments for board independence. Thus, 
an analysis of the impact of increased board independence and analyst coverage on the occurrence 
of accounting restatements can be confounded by their impact on the detection of accounting 
irregularities.  
 
6. Conclusion  
                                                 
26 For example, of the 22 firms with accounting irregularities in the pre-SOX period, only two firms announce 
restatements in the post-SOX period. 
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In this paper, we examine the effectiveness of the recent regulatory requirement of majority 
board independence in reducing earnings management. Firms that did not have a majority 
independent board in the pre-regulation period have to increase their board independence. This 
provides a natural setting to examine whether increases in board independence lead to a reduction 
in earnings management.  
Our sample includes 1,205 firms that have board structure information in 2000 and available 
financial data. Among these firms, 385 did not have a majority independent board in 2000 
(referred to as non-compliance firms), while the rest already had a majority independent board in 
2000 (referred to as compliance firms). We compare the change in the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals (|DA|) from the pre-regulation period (1999-2001) to the post-regulation 
period (2004-2006) between non-compliance and compliance firms. We find that (1) overall, non-
compliance firms do not experience an incremental reduction in |DA| compared to compliance 
firms; (2) the effect of increased board independence in reducing earnings management decreases 
with information acquisition cost; non-compliance firms with low information acquisition cost 
experience a significant reduction in |DA| compared with compliance firms. These results are 
robust to alternative measures of earnings management and information acquisition cost.  
We also examine the impact of the regulatory requirement of wholly independent audit 
committees on earnings management. The inferences are similar: an increase in audit committee 
independence leads to a reduction in earnings management when information acquisition cost is 
low. Moreover, we find that the above inferences only apply to firms that started with a relatively 
low level of audit committee independence.  
Additional analyses indicate that (1) the reduction in |DA| for non-compliance firms with 
low information acquisition cost is consistent with a reduction in opportunistic earnings 
management, and (2) compared to compliance firms, non-compliance firms with low information 
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acquisition cost also experience a relative reduction in real earnings management.  
Our paper contributes to the literature on board composition and earnings management by 
providing direct evidence on the effectiveness of the recent regulatory reform of board structure in 
reducing earnings management. Our setting of mandated and exogenous increases in board 
independence is less likely to be subject to endogeneity problems than prior studies. In addition, 
we demonstrate that the effectiveness of increases in board and audit committee independence in 
reducing earnings management is stronger when independent directors have easier access to 
information.   
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Appendix: Variable definitions and description of control variables 
 
Panel A Variable definitions 
 
|DA| = the absolute value of discretionary accruals; discretionary accruals are 
derived from the modified cross-sectional Jones model, which is estimated 
every year for each Fama-French industry that has at least ten observations 
in the Compustat population;  
AC = analyst coverage, measured as the number of unique analysts who issue at 
least one annual earnings forecast in the year; in the regressions, we take 
the natural logarithm of AC (ln(1+AC)); 
INST = percentage of shares owned by institutional investors; 
ROA = return on assets, calculated as the ratio of net income to total assets; 
M/B = market-to-book ratio, calculated as the ratio of the market value of equity 
to the book of equity;  
Size = natural logarithm of market value of equity;  
Financing = an indicator variable, which is equal to 1 when a firm issues equity or debt 
in the year, specifically, if the firm has cash flows from either issuance of 
debts or sales of common stocks in the year; 
LEV = leverage, measured as total long-term debt scaled by total assets. 
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Appendix (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B Description of control variables 
 
The choice of the control variables follows prior research. Prior research suggests that 
institutional investors can serve a monitoring role and alleviate managers’ opportunistic self-
serving behavior (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1986; McConnell and Servaes 1990). Several studies 
find that higher institutional ownership is associated with lower extent of earnings management 
(e.g., Chung, Firth, and Kim 2002). Institutional ownership is measured as the percentage of 
shares owned by institutional investors as reported in the CDA/Spectrum database, and we expect 
a negative coefficient on ΔINST. We include return-on-asset (ROA) because firms’ performance 
affects the estimated discretionary accruals (Kothari, Leone, and Wasley 2005) and managers’ 
incentive to engage in earnings management (Chung et al. 2002). We expect that firms with 
poorer performance are more likely to engage in earnings management, and thus a negative 
coefficient on ΔROA. The market-to-book ratio (M/B) captures firms’ growth opportunities. 
Skinner and Sloan (2002) show that the consequences of missing earnings forecasts are more 
severe for growth firms, and thus firms with high market-to-book ratio are a priori more likely to 
engage in earnings management (Chung and Kallapur 2003). Therefore, ΔM/B is expected to be 
positively correlated with ∆|DA|. Previous research suggests that firm size is positively associated 
with discretionary accruals (Becker et al. 1998; DeFond and Park 1997; Chung et al. 2002). We 
measure firm size as the natural logarithm of market value and expect a positive coefficient on 
ΔSize. Following prior research (DeFond and Subramanyam 1998; Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson 
2002; Chung and Kallapur 2003), we control for firms’ external financing activities because 
managers might engage in earnings management before debt or stock issuance. We use an 
indicator variable (Financing) to capture debt or equity issuance. Since prior studies provide 
mixed results regarding the association between financing activities and the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals, we have no directional prediction for ΔFinancing.27 Prior research argues 
that firms have incentives to engage in earnings management to relax debt covenant and to avoid 
debt covenant violation (e.g., Sweeney 1994). Following this line of research, we use leverage 
(LEV), measured as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, to proxy for the closeness of debt 
covenant violation. Finally, Yu (2008) finds that analyst coverage reduces the extent of earnings 
management. We measure analyst coverage (AC) as the natural logarithm of the number of 
analysts who issue earnings forecasts in the year. We expect ΔLEV and ΔAC to have positive and 
negative coefficients, respectively.  
  
                                                 
27 For example, in regressions using absolute value of discretionary accruals as the dependent variable, Frankel et al. 
(2002) find an insignificant coefficient on the indicator variable for securities issuance while Chung and Kallapur 
(2003) find a positive coefficient.  
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Table 1 
Over-time change in board independence for compliance and non-compliance firms 
 
Our sample includes 1,205 firms with data on board structure in 2000 and available financial information required to 
calculate discretionary accruals and other variables. This table presents the average board independence and the 
percentage of firms with a majority independent board, that is, more than 50 percent of the directors are independent, 
separately for compliance and non-compliance firms. Compliance firms refer to those with a majority independent 
board in 2000, and the rest are non-compliance firms.  
 
  
Compliance firms 
(N=820)  
Non-compliance firms 
(N=385) 
Year  
Mean board 
independence 
% of firms with a majority 
independent board  
Mean board 
independence 
% of firms with a majority 
independent board 
2000  72.01% 100.00%  38.41% 0.00% 
2001  72.03% 94.71%  43.38% 21.32% 
2002  72.81% 94.61%  47.72% 32.58% 
2003  74.57% 94.92%  53.21% 52.90% 
2004  75.96% 96.71%  58.50% 68.05% 
2005  76.56% 96.59%  60.24% 74.29%28 
 
 
  
                                                 
28 The primary reason for why some firms did not comply with the requirement by 2005 (according to the IRRC) is 
the difference in the definition of independent directors between the company and IRRC; the IRRC’s definition tends 
to be stricter.  
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics on earnings management proxies and control variables for our sample, 
which consists of 1,205 firms with data on board structure in 2000 and available financial information to calculate 
discretionary accruals and other variables. Compliance firms refer to those with a majority independent board in 2000 
and, the rest are non-compliance firms. Panel A reports the statistics for the full sample, Panel B for compliance 
firms, and Panel C for non-compliance firms. Panel D reports the Pearson correlation between the change in these 
variables between 2000 and 2005. |DA| is the three-year average for 1999-2001 (pre-regulation) or 2004-2006 (post-
regulation). See Appendix for definitions of the other variables.  
 
Pre-regulation 
(2000) 
Post-regulation 
(2005) 
p-value based 
on t-test for 
diff. in mean  
p-value based 
on Z-test for 
diff. in median mean median mean median 
 
Panel A Descriptive statistics for all firms (N=1,205) 
|DA|  0.084 0.058 0.057 0.042 0.00 0.00 
AC  13.083 10.000 13.347 11.000 0.55 0.21 
INST 0.413 0.433 0.518 0.523 0.00 0.00 
ROA 0.047 0.050 0.045 0.052 0.75 0.86 
M/B 3.568 2.243 2.843 2.300 0.00 0.53 
Size 7.406 7.351 7.726 7.659 0.00 0.00 
Financing 0.631 1.000 0.584 1.000 0.02 0.02 
LEV 0.207 0.193 0.188 0.161 0.01 0.00 
 
Panel B Descriptive statistics for compliance firms (N=820) 
|DA|  0.078 0.057 0.054 0.042 0.00 0.00 
AC  13.501 11.000 13.382 11.000 0.82 0.86 
INST 0.419 0.440 0.521 0.524 0.00 0.00 
ROA 0.050 0.050 0.044 0.051 0.25 0.44 
M/B 3.612 2.254 2.849 2.261 0.00 0.71 
Size 7.504 7.437 7.809 7.694 0.00 0.00 
Financing 0.639 1.000 0.606 1.000 0.17 0.17 
LEV 0.207 0.201 0.189 0.173 0.03 0.00 
 
Panel C Descriptive statistics for non-compliance firms (N=385) 
|DA| 0.096 0.062 0.063 0.044 0.00 0.00 
AC  12.192 9.000 13.273 11.000 0.17 0.07 
INST 0.401 0.397 0.511 0.519 0.00 0.00 
ROA 0.039 0.051 0.048 0.057 0.40 0.46 
M/B 3.476 2.224 2.832 2.332 0.04 0.56 
Size 7.199 7.177 7.550 7.510 0.00 0.00 
Financing 0.613 1.000 0.538 1.000 0.03 0.03 
LEV 0.209 0.166 0.186 0.131 0.12 0.13 
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Table 2 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel D Pearson correlation table for change in key variables between 2000 and 2005 
 
This panel reports the Pearson correlation coefficients among change in |DA|, the Non-Compliance indicator, and the 
control variables. Change in |DA| is the change from the pre-regulation period (1999-2001) to the post-regulation 
period (2004-2006). Non_Compliance is one for firms that did not have a majority independent board in 2000 and 
zero otherwise. Changes in control variables are measured between 2000 and 2005. Correlation coefficients in bold 
are significant at the 5 percent level.  
 
Δ|DA| 
Non-
Compliance ΔINST ΔROA ΔM/B ΔSize ΔFinancing ΔLEV
Non-Compliance -0.041 
ΔINST 0.014 0.020
ΔROA -0.371 0.046 0.141
ΔM/B 0.034 0.010 0.099 0.161
ΔSize 0.195 0.023 0.232 0.316 0.354
ΔFinancing 0.003 -0.036 -0.012 -0.031 0.009 0.037 
ΔLEV -0.067 -0.016 -0.017 -0.151 -0.158 -0.292 0.183
ΔAC 0.024 0.035 0.465 0.006 0.047 0.179 0.011 -0.064
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Table 3 
Increases in board independence and changes in earnings management  
 
This table reports the regression results of the following model: 
∆|ܦܣ| ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܰ݋݊_ܥ݋݉݌݈݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ ൅ ࢼܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ ൅ ߝ     (1) 
The sample includes 1,205 firms with data on board structure in 2000 and available financial information to calculate 
discretionary accruals (DA) and other variables. Non_Compliance in column (1) is an indicator variable, one for 
firms that did not have a majority independent board in 2000 (non-compliance firms), and zero otherwise. 
Non_Compliance in column (2) is one for firms that did not have a majority independent board in 2000 but had a 
majority independent board in 2005, and zero otherwise. The control variables include changes from 2000 to 2005 in 
the following variables: INST, ROA, M/B, Size, Financing, LEV, and AC. See the Appendix for the measurement of 
these variables. For brevity, the coefficients on industry fixed effects are not reported. T-statistics are presented in 
parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, based 
on two-sided tests.  
  
Non-compliance indicator 
defined based on 2000 
information  
Non-compliance indicator 
defined based on 2000 and 
2005 information 
  (1)  (2) 
Intercept  -0.044***  -0.044*** 
  (-3.30)  (-3.28) 
Non_Compliance  -0.005  -0.007 
  (-0.77)  (-1.05) 
ΔINST  0.015  0.015 
  (0.88)  (0.88) 
ΔROA  -0.336***  -0.336*** 
  (-18.14)  (-18.13) 
ΔM/B  -0.000  -0.000 
  (-0.38)  (-0.40) 
ΔSize  0.030***  0.030*** 
  (8.39)  (8.38) 
ΔFinancing  -0.006  -0.006 
  (-1.20)  (-1.20) 
ΔLEV  -0.045**  -0.045** 
  (-2.41)  (-2.40) 
ΔAC  -0.004  -0.004 
  (-1.17)  (-1.17) 
 
Industry Fixed Effects  YES  YES 
N  1,205  1,205 
Adj. R2  0.322  0.322 
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Table 4 
Increases in board independence, information access, and changes in earnings management  
 
Panel A Using continuous analyst coverage variable as proxy for information access  
This table reports the regression results of the following model: 
∆|ܦܣ| ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܰ݋݊_ܥ݋݉݌݈݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ ൅ ߙଶܰ݋݊_ܥ݋݉݌݈݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ ൈ ܣܥ ൅ ߙଷܣܥ ൅ ࢼܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ ൅ ߝ  (2) 
The sample includes1,205 firms with data on board structure in 2000 and available financial information to calculate 
discretionary accruals (DA) and other variables. Non_Compliance in column (1) is an indicator variable, one for 
firms that did not have a majority independent board in 2000 (non-compliance firms), and zero otherwise. 
Non_Compliance in column (2) is one for firms that did not have a majority independent board in 2000 but had a 
majority independent board in 2005, and zero otherwise. Analyst coverage (AC) is used as the proxy for information 
acquisition cost. The control variables include changes from 2000 to 2005 in the following variables: INST, ROA, 
M/B, Size, Financing, LEV, and AC. See the Appendix for variable measurement. For brevity, the coefficients on 
industry fixed effects are not reported. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance levels at 
the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on two-sided tests.  
  
Non-compliance indicator 
defined based on 2000 
information  
Non-compliance indicator 
defined based on 2000 and 
2005 information 
  (1)  (2) 
Intercept  -0.037**  -0.037** 
  (-2.40)  (-2.47) 
Non_Compliance  0.028**  0.039*** 
  (2.11)  (2.74) 
Non_Compliance × AC  -0.015***  -0.021*** 
  (-2.88)  (-3.59) 
AC  -0.005  -0.004 
  (-1.20)  (-1.23) 
ΔINST  0.012  0.011 
  (0.70)  (0.63) 
ΔROA  -0.327***  -0.326*** 
  (-17.68)  (-17.64) 
ΔM/B  -0.000  -0.001 
  (-0.86)  (-0.93) 
ΔSize  0.030***  0.030*** 
  (8.41)  (8.51) 
ΔFinancing  -0.006  -0.005 
  (-1.12)  (-1.07) 
ΔLEV  -0.048**  -0.046** 
  (-2.57)  (-2.50) 
ΔAC  -0.010**  -0.010** 
  (-2.55)  (-2.47) 
Industry Fixed Effects  YES  YES 
N  1,205  1,205 
Adj. R2  0.331  0.334 
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Table 4 (Cont’d) 
Panel B Using high vs. low analyst coverage indicator variables to proxy for information access 
This table reports the regression results of the following model: 
∆|ܦܣ| ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܰ݋݊_ܥ݋݉݌݈݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ ൈ ܮ݋ݓ_ܣܥ ൅ ߙଶܰ݋݊_ܥ݋݉݌݈݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ ൈ ܪ݄݅݃_ܣܥ 
 ൅ ߙଷܪ݄݅݃_ܣܥ ൅ ࢼܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ ൅ ߝ       (3) 
The sample includes1,205 firms with data on board structure in 2000 and available financial information to calculate 
discretionary accruals (DA) and other variables. Non_Compliance in column (1) is an indicator variable, one for 
firms that did not have a majority independent board in 2000 (non-compliance firms), and zero otherwise. 
Non_Compliance in column (2) is one for firms that did not have a majority independent board in 2000 but had a 
majority independent board in 2005, and zero otherwise. Low_AC (High_AC) is an indicator for firms with analyst 
coverage lower (higher) than the sample median. The control variables include changes from 2000 to 2005 in the 
following variables: INST, ROA, M/B, Size, Financing, LEV, and AC. See the Appendix for variable measurement. 
For brevity, the coefficients on industry fixed effects are not reported. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
*,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on two-sided 
tests. 
  
Non-compliance 
indicator defined based 
on 2000 information  
Non-compliance indicator 
defined based on 2000 
and 2005 information 
  (1)  (2) 
Intercept  -0.047***  -0.047*** 
  (-3.47)  (-3.48) 
Non_Compliance× Low_AC  0.010  0.014 
  (1.24)  (1.61) 
Non_Compliance × High_AC  -0.021**  -0.028*** 
  (-2.53)  (-3.13) 
High_AC  0.003  0.004 
  (0.46)  (0.54) 
ΔINST  0.017  0.015 
  (1.00)  (0.91) 
ΔROA  -0.333***  -0.331*** 
  (-17.95)  (-17.89) 
ΔM/B  -0.000  -0.000 
  (-0.64)  (-0.67) 
ΔSize  0.030***  0.030*** 
  (8.28)  (8.37) 
ΔFinancing  -0.006  -0.006 
  (-1.14)  (-1.16) 
ΔLEV  -0.048**  -0.047** 
  (-2.57)  (-2.53) 
ΔAC  -0.005  -0.005 
  (-1.47)  (-1.38) 
 
Industry Fixed Effects  YES  YES 
N  1,205  1,205 
Adj. R2  0.326  0.328 
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Table 5 
Sensitivity tests – Using alternative proxies of information acquisition cost  
This table reports the regression results when using alternative proxies for information acquisition cost: 
∆|ܦܣ| ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܰ݋݊_ܥ݋݉݌݈݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ ൅ ߙଶܰ݋݊_ܥ݋݉݌݈݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ ൈ ܶݎܽ݊ݏ݌ܽݎ݁݊ܿݕ ൅ ߙଷܶݎܽ݊ݏ݌ܽݎ݁݊ܿݕ ൅ ࢼܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ
൅ ߝ 
∆|ܦܣ| ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܰ݋݊_ܥ݋݉݌݈݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ ൅ ߙଶܰ݋݊_ܥ݋݉݌݈݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ ൈ ܦ݅ݎ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ_ܵܽ݉݁_ܫ݊݀ ൅ ߙଷܦ݅ݎ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ_ܵܽ݉݁_ܫ݊݀
൅ ࢼܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ ൅ ߝ 
The sample includes1,205 firms with data on board structure in 2000 and available financial information to calculate 
discretionary accruals (DA) and other variables. Non_Compliance is one for firms that did not have a majority 
independent board in 2000 but had a majority independent board in 2005, and zero otherwise. The transparency 
measure (Transparency) is based on the following four proxies: (1) turnover – average daily trading volume scaled by 
total number of shares outstanding, (2) average bid-ask spread over the year, where bid-ask spread is the difference 
between bid price and ask price scaled by the average of the two, (3) analyst coverage, and (4) forecast error – the 
absolute value of the difference between actual EPS and the consensus analyst forecast before earnings 
announcement, scaled by stock price. We add up the decile ranks of these four variables (reverse ranks for bid-ask 
spread and forecast error) and then standardize it to the range [0, 1]. Director_Same_Ind is an indicator variable for 
independent directors working in the same industry, and it is one for firms with at least one independent director who 
are high-level executives in the same industry as the firm and zero otherwise. Director_Same_Ind is measured in 
2005. The control variables include changes from 2000 to 2005 in the following variables: INST, ROA, M/B, Size, 
Financing, LEV, and AC. See the Appendix for variable measurement. For brevity, the coefficients on control 
variables and industry fixed effects are not reported. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. *,**,*** denote 
significance levels at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on two-sided tests.  
 
  (1) (2) 
Intercept  -0.019 -0.045*** 
  (-1.28) (-3.40) 
Non_Compliance  0.071*** 0.006 
  (4.14) (0.81) 
Non_Compliance × Transparency  -0.139***  
  (-4.83)  
Transparency  -0.020  
  (-1.14)  
Non_Compliance × Director_Same_Ind   -0.072*** 
   (-4.42) 
Director_Same_Ind   0.005 
   (0.61) 
Control Variables  YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects  YES YES 
N  1,205 1,205 
Adj. R2  0.333 0.334 
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Table 6 
Mechanisms used by noncompliance firms to increase board independence and the changes 
in earnings management  
 
This table reports the regression results of the following model: 
∆|ܦܣ| ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܰ݋݊_ܥ݋݉݌݈݅ܽ݊ܿ݁_ܣ݀݀ ൅ ߙଶܰ݋݊_ܥ݋݉݌݈݅ܽ݊ܿ݁_ܣ݀݀ ൈ ܣܥ ൅ ߙଷܰ݋݊_ܥ݋݉݌݈݅ܽ݊ܿ݁_ܦݎ݋݌
൅ ߙସܰ݋݊_ܥ݋݉݌݈݅ܽ݊ܿ݁_ܦݎ݋݌ ൈ ܣܥ ൅ ߙହܣܥ ൅ ࢼܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ ൅ ߝ 
The sample includes1,205 firms with data on board structure in 2000 and available financial information to calculate 
discretionary accruals (DA) and other variables. Non-compliance firms include those firms that did not have a 
majority independent board in 2000 but had a majority independent board in 2005. Non_Compliance_Add (_Drop) is 
an indicator variable, one for non-compliance firms that added independent directors (dropped insider directors) from 
2000 to 2005, and zero otherwise. Analyst coverage (AC) is used as the proxy for information acquisition cost. The 
control variables include changes from 2000 to 2005 in the following variables: INST, ROA, M/B, Size, Financing, 
LEV, and AC. See the Appendix for variable measurement. For brevity, the coefficients on industry fixed effects are 
not reported. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10 percent, 5 percent, 
and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on two-sided tests.  
 
Intercept   -0.038** 
   (-2.55) 
Non_Compliance_Add   0.009 
   (0.38) 
Non_Compliance_Add× AC   -0.019** 
   (-2.04) 
Non_Compliance_Drop   0.045** 
   (1.97) 
Non_Compliance_Drop× AC   -0.007 
   (-0.74) 
AC   -0.004 
   (-1.20) 
ΔINST   0.012 
   (0.73) 
ΔROA   -0.329*** 
   (-18.10) 
ΔM/B   -0.001 
   (-1.09) 
ΔSize   0.030*** 
   (8.66) 
ΔFinancing   -0.004 
   (-0.76) 
ΔLEV   -0.045** 
   (-2.47) 
ΔAC   -0.009** 
   (-2.37) 
Industry Fixed Effects   YES 
N   1,205 
Adj. R2   0.348 
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Table 7 
Increases in audit committee independence, information access, and changes in earnings 
management  
This table reports the regression results of the following model: 
∆|ܦܣ| ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܰ݋݊_ܥ݋݉݌݈݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ ൅ ߙଶܰ݋݊_ܥ݋݉݌݈݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ ൈ ܣܥ ൅ ߙଷܣܥ ൅ ࢼܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ ൅ ߝ  (2) 
The sample includes1,205 firms with data on board structure in 2000 and available financial information to calculate 
discretionary accruals (DA) and other variables. Non_Compliance in column (1) is an indicator variable, one for 
firms that did not have a 100 percent independent audit committee in 2000 (non-compliance firms) but had a 100 
percent independent audit committee in 2005 and zero otherwise. Non_Compliance in column (2) is one for firms that 
had a less than 67 percent independent audit committee in 2000 but had a 100 percent independent audit committee in 
2005 and zero otherwise. Analyst coverage (AC) is used as the proxy for information acquisition cost. The control 
variables include changes from 2000 to 2005 in the following variables: INST, ROA, M/B, Size, Financing, LEV, 
and AC. See the Appendix for variable measurement. For brevity, the coefficients on industry fixed effects are not 
reported. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10 percent, 5 percent, 
and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on two-sided tests.  
  
Non-compliance indicator 
based on 100% independent 
audit committee  
Non-compliance indicator 
based on 67% independent 
audit committee 
  (1)  (2) 
Intercept  -0.028*  -0.030** 
  (-1.84)  (-2.04) 
Non_Compliance  0.001  0.013
  (0.09)  (0.80)
Non_Compliance × AC  -0.006  -0.014** 
  (-1.00)  (-2.20) 
AC  -0.008**  -0.008** 
  (-2.25)  (-2.16) 
ΔINST  0.005  0.006
  (0.32)  (0.33)
ΔROA  -0.329***  -0.325*** 
  (-17.75)  (-17.58) 
ΔM/B  -0.000  -0.000 
  (-0.78)  (-0.80) 
ΔSize  0.030***  0.030*** 
  (8.41)  (8.41)
ΔFinancing  -0.006  -0.006 
  (-1.23)  (-1.15) 
ΔLEV  -0.045**  -0.045** 
  (-2.42)  (-2.44) 
ΔAC  -0.010**  -0.010** 
  (-2.47)  (-2.50) 
Industry Fixed Effects  YES  YES 
N  1,205  1,205 
# of non-compliance firms  325  216 
Adj. R2  0.328  0.332 
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Table 8  
Association between predicted change in earnings management and future performance 
 
This table reports results of the following regression: 
 
CFO ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܲݎ݁݀݅ܿݐ݁݀ Δ|ܦܣ| ൅ ߙଶߪCFO ൅ ߙଷ݈ܽ݃ሺܥܨܱሻ ൅ ߙସLn ሺ݈ܵܽ݁ݏሻ ൅ ߝ   (4a) 
ROA ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܲݎ݁݀݅ܿݐ݁݀ Δ|ܦܣ| ൅ ߙଶߪROA ൅ ߙଷ݈ܽ݃ሺܴܱܣሻ ൅ ߙସLn ሺ݈ܵܽ݁ݏሻ ൅ ߝ   (4b) 
 
The sample includes1,205 firms with data on board structure in 2000 and available financial information to calculate 
discretionary accruals (DA) and other variables. CFO and ROA are measured as the average of CFO and ROA in the 
post-regulation period 2004-2006. ROA is the income before extraordinary items scaled by lagged total assets; CFO 
is cash flows from operating activities scaled by lagged total assets. Predicted change in |DA| is the sum of the 
product of the following three variables and their respective estimated coefficients in Panel A, Column (1) of Table 4: 
Non_Compliance, AC, and Non_compliance ×AC. σCFO (σROA) is the standard deviation of quarterly ROA (CFO) 
for the three-year window prior to the window of performance measure (i.e., 2001-2003). Quarterly CFO is 
calculated as sales less cost of goods sold, SG&A, and change in working capital. Working capital is current assets 
other than cash and short-term investments minus current liabilities. Lag(CFO) (lag(ROA)) is calculated as the 
average CFO (ROA) in the period 2001-2003. Ln(Sales) is the logarithm of sales in 2003. We multiply the coefficient 
on Ln(Sales) by 1,000 to make it readable. For brevity, the coefficients on industry fixed effects are not reported. T-
statistics are presented in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent 
levels, respectively, based on two-sided tests. 
Future CFO Future ROA  
  
Intercept 0.007 0.014  
(0.79) (1.45)  
Predicted Δ|DA|  -0.298*** -0.397***  
(-3.74) (-4.47)  
σCFO -0.017   
(-0.43)   
σROA  -0.088**  
 (-2.21)  
Lag(CFO) 0.701***   
(38.39)   
Lag(ROA)  0.613***  
 (30.96)  
Ln(Sales) 0.001* 0.002***  
(1.65) (2.70)  
   
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES  
N 1,205 1,205  
Adj. R2 0.613 0.531  
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Table 9 
Increases in board independence, information access,  
and changes in real earnings management  
This table reports the regression results of the following model: 
∆|ܴ݈݁ܽ ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ ݉ܽ݊ܽ݃݁݉݁݊ݐ ݌ݎ݋ݔ݅݁ݏ| 
ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܰ݋݊_ܿ݋݉݌݈݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ ൅ ߙଶܰ݋݊_ܿ݋݉݌݈݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ ൈ ܣܥ ൅ ߙଷܣܥ ൅ ࢼܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ ൅ ߝ                    (5) 
The sample includes 994 firms with data on board structure in 2000 and available financial information to calculate 
real earnings management proxies and other variables. Real earnings management proxies include the absolute value 
of the residuals from industry-year regressions of production costs (cost of goods sold and change in inventory), 
discretionary expenses (advertising, R&D, and SG&A), and cash flow from operations on sales, change in sales, and 
lagged change in sales, as in Roychowdhury (2006). The aggregated real earnings management proxy is the sum of 
the standardized value of the three individual proxies (i.e., scaled by their corresponding standard deviation). 
Non_Compliance is one for firms that did not have a majority independent board in 2000 but had a majority 
independent board in 2005, and zero otherwise. The change in real earnings management is measured as the 
difference between the average value in the post-regulation period (2004-2006) and the pre-regulation period (1999-
2001). The control variables include changes from 2000 to 2005 in the following variables: INST, ROA, M/B, Size, 
Financing, LEV, and AC. See the Appendix for variable measurement. For brevity, the coefficients on industry fixed 
effects are not reported. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on two-sided tests.  
  Real earnings management proxies 
  
Production 
costs 
Discretionary 
expenses 
Cash flow from 
operations 
Aggregated real 
earnings management 
Intercept  0.016 0.007 0.005 0.629* 
  (0.99) (0.42) (0.47) (1.81) 
Non_Compliance  0.000 0.038** 0.026** 0.701** 
  (0.03) (2.18) (2.31) (2.02) 
Non_Compliance × AC  -0.000 -0.013* -0.009** -0.251* 
  (-0.05) (-1.86) (-2.05) (-1.78) 
AC  -0.010** -0.003 -0.007** -0.229** 
  (-2.47) (-0.76) (-2.40) (-2.55) 
ΔINST  0.015 0.025 0.011 0.470 
  (0.79) (1.23) (0.83) (1.17) 
ΔROA  0.015 -0.145*** -0.035*** -1.445*** 
  (0.78) (-6.89) (-2.62) (-3.49) 
ΔM/B  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.064*** 
  (3.54) (2.72) (4.91) (5.03) 
ΔSize  0.001 0.008** 0.003 0.122 
  (0.28) (1.99) (1.27) (1.47) 
ΔFinancing  -0.007 -0.006 0.004 -0.040 
  (-1.30) (-1.10) (1.07) (-0.35) 
ΔLEV  0.003 -0.009 -0.005 -0.110 
  (0.12) (-0.38) (-0.34) (-0.24) 
ΔAC  -0.011** -0.011** -0.012*** -0.371*** 
  (-2.53) (-2.29) (-4.03) (-4.00) 
Industry Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES 
N  994 994 994 994 
Adj. R2  0.059 0.112 0.078 0.107 
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Table 10 
The level regression of earnings management, board independence, and information access  
 
This table reports the regression results of the following model: 
|ܦܣ| ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܯ݆ܽ݋ݎ݅ݐݕܫ݊݀ ൅ ߙଶܯ݆ܽ݋ݎ݅ݐݕܫ݊݀ ൈ ܣܥ ൅ ࢼܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ ൅ ߝ   (6) 
The sample includes1,205 firms with data on board structure in 2000 and available financial information to calculate 
discretionary accruals (DA) and other variables. MajorityInd is an indicator variable, one for firms that have a 
majority independent board in 2000, and zero otherwise. The control variables include the following variables: INST, 
ROA, M/B, Size, Financing, LEV, and AC. |DA| and the control variables are measured in 2000. See the Appendix 
for variable measurement. For brevity, the coefficients on the intercept, control variables and industry fixed effects 
are not reported. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on two-sided tests.  
  (1) (2)  
MajorityInd  -0.011* 0.020  
  (-1.86) (1.61)  
MajorityInd × AC   -0.014***  
   (-2.77)  
 
Control Variables   YES YES  
 
Industry Fixed Effects  YES YES  
N  1,205 1,205  
Adj. R2  0.399 0.403  
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 Figure 1 
The change in the independence of boards of directors and audit committees from 1998-
2006 
 
This figure depicts the over-time change in the mean independence level of boards of directors (Figure 1A) and the 
audit committees (Figure 1B). Figure 1A also presents the percentage of firms with boards that consist of a majority 
of independent directors, and Figure 1B also presents the percentage of firms with audit committees that consist of 
only independent directors. The sample includes 1,205 firms with data on board structure and financial information to 
calculate discretionary accruals and other variables. 
 
Figure 1A Over-time change in board independence 
 
Figure 1B Over-time change in audit committee independence 
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